As the war in Ukraine nears a turning point, the world watches to see how Russia will rebuild its military strength. The choices made in the coming years will not only define the Russian armed forces but also recalibrate global security dynamics. What path will Moscow take, and how will its strategic vision shape the postwar landscape?

Facing a New Strategic Reality

While the precise outcome of the Ukraine conflict remains uncertain, one truth stands firm - when the fighting stops, Russia will be left with the daunting task of reconstructing its military capabilities. The war has tested the limits of its armed forces, revealing both structural weaknesses and operational shortcomings. The challenge ahead is not just logistical, but political and ideological. What kind of military does Russia want for the future, and how does it plan to get there?

This period of reconstitution will present Russian leadership with a critical inflection point. The decisions made could diverge significantly from the historical patterns established in the post-Soviet era. Rather than following a linear evolution, Russia may reconsider foundational aspects of its military structure, training philosophy, force composition, and strategic partnerships.

Importantly, Russia’s reconstruction process will unfold within a broader geopolitical context. Economic constraints, demographic shifts, and the influence of allies and adversaries will all shape the available options. Past reform attempts, some ambitious and others incomplete, provide insight into what might lie ahead - and what pitfalls must be avoided.

The Legacy of the “New Look” Reforms

To understand how Russia might move forward, it is essential to look back at the last major effort to modernize its armed forces. In 2008, then-Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov introduced a comprehensive set of changes known as the “New Look” reforms. These reforms marked the most sweeping transformation of the Russian military since the Red Army’s creation in 1918, driven by a pressing need to update outdated Soviet-era doctrines and make the military more agile in modern conflicts.

The reforms were largely a response to the operational failures observed during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Key weaknesses - including poor mobility, inefficient logistics, weak command and control systems, and an underperforming aerospace force - highlighted the gap between Russia’s military ambitions and its actual capabilities.

“New Look” aimed to reshape the armed forces for 21st-century warfare. It promoted smaller, more mobile units; professionalized recruitment; increased readiness levels; and emphasized advanced technology and noncontact combat capabilities. Strategic mobility and responsiveness were prioritized over mass conscription and rigid command structures. In theory, the changes represented a leap forward.

However, in practice, implementation was mixed. Resistance from traditionalists within the armed forces and political establishment, coupled with budgetary limitations and a fragmented defense-industrial base, slowed or diluted the reforms. Despite this, many of the ideas introduced during this period continue to influence Russian military thinking, particularly in the context of reconstitution planning after Ukraine.

Strategic Framework: Exploring the Pathways to Reconstitution

In their effort to anticipate Russia’s future defense posture, researchers at RAND adopted a multidimensional approach. Drawing from a wide array of sources - including Russian- and English-language scholarship, battlefield assessments, internal policy documents, and extensive interviews with military analysts and officials across NATO, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Sweden - they identified four plausible pathways Russia might pursue in reconstituting its military.

Each pathway represents a distinct strategic orientation, characterized by the balance Russia might seek between quality and quantity, conservatism and innovation, independence and reliance on foreign partners. These conceptual models are not necessarily exclusive. In fact, Russia is more likely to adopt a hybrid approach that borrows elements from multiple trajectories based on emerging needs, available resources, and ideological leanings.

To maintain analytical clarity, the researchers applied a shared set of baseline assumptions across all models:

  • The war in Ukraine has ended.
  • Russia retains a leadership structure with objectives similar to those under President Putin, even if he is no longer in power.
  • Russian leadership continues to view NATO and the United States as strategic threats.
  • Partnerships with China, Iran, Belarus, and North Korea remain intact or deepen further.
  • Demographic and economic trends continue along current trajectories, without significant shocks.
  • No mass uprising occurs against the Russian state or its military establishment.
  • Russia maintains existing territorial claims and aspirations in its near abroad.

With these assumptions in place, RAND outlined four conceptual pathways for Russia’s military reconstitution:

  • The Shoigu Plan – A continuation of existing structures with targeted improvements.
  • Revisiting Old Models – A return to Soviet-style mass mobilization and conscription.
  • A New, New Look – A leaner, more technologically advanced force with selective specialization.
  • A New Operational Model – A deep structural overhaul inspired by foreign doctrine, particularly Western or Chinese models.

Each of these strategies entails varying degrees of organizational change, political will, and international dependence. The implications for Western defense planning and NATO deterrence strategy differ markedly in each case. What follows is a detailed examination of each pathway, their underlying logic, and the challenges Russia might face in implementing them.

Pathway 1: The Shoigu Plan – Reforming Within the Status Quo

Named after Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s long-serving Minister of Defense during the early phase of the Ukraine conflict, this pathway envisions reconstitution not through radical transformation, but by addressing perceived failures in execution rather than structure. According to this logic, the Russian military did not lose due to fundamental organizational deficiencies, but rather due to inadequate leadership, coordination, and battlefield misjudgments. Thus, targeted improvements, rather than wholesale reforms, are proposed.

The Shoigu Plan emphasizes selective qualitative investments in logistics, command and control systems, and tactical readiness. The aim is to strengthen the existing force without overhauling its ideological or institutional foundations. The structure remains familiar, but refined to correct the deficiencies exposed during the Ukraine campaign.

However, expert opinion gathered by RAND researchers casts doubt on the feasibility of this plan. While some observers acknowledge its theoretical coherence, many consider it impractical or overly optimistic. Some regional analysts in Eastern Europe described the strategy as “just paperwork” - more rhetorical than operationally realistic.

Even among those who believe in the plan’s viability, confidence is limited to its quantitative elements - expanding troop numbers and increasing production of basic military equipment. The more ambitious qualitative upgrades, such as integrating high-tech systems or streamlining logistics across vast military districts, are seen as far more difficult to achieve.

Challenges of Implementation

Russia’s industrial and technological limitations are a major hurdle. Though the state has redirected considerable financial resources into the defense sector, systemic inefficiencies remain entrenched. Corruption, mismanagement, and outdated infrastructure continue to undermine defense productivity. RAND experts highlight that increased budgets do not automatically translate into effective reconstitution. Instead, they often expand the opportunity for graft, especially in opaque procurement systems.

Labor shortages and brain drain further complicate the picture. Since the onset of the Ukraine war, a significant segment of Russia’s technically skilled population has emigrated. Among those who remain, demographic decline and an aging workforce reduce the available talent pool for advanced weapons development and defense innovation. These trends challenge the state's ability to staff new projects, maintain existing systems, and upgrade force capabilities.

Dependence on Foreign Support

Russia’s defense partnerships are another critical variable. Iran, for instance, has already supplied drones that had a measurable impact on the battlefield. These systems have been integrated into Russia’s operations with mixed but significant results. North Korea, meanwhile, has contributed older munitions and, reportedly, a limited number of personnel. But its technological offerings are minimal, and its economy remains too underdeveloped to offer strategic innovation.

Despite these limitations, the Shoigu Plan continues to influence Russian strategic conversations. It offers a politically safe option for the Kremlin - one that does not challenge entrenched hierarchies or require disruptive change. For this reason alone, it cannot be discounted, even if its ultimate success remains in doubt.

Pathway 2: Revisiting Old Models – The Return to Soviet-Era Foundations

This pathway suggests that instead of innovating or refining, Russia may choose to revive a familiar formula: the traditional Soviet military model. During the war in Ukraine, many aspects of this model reemerged by necessity. Facing logistical challenges, equipment shortages, and mounting battlefield casualties, Russia fell back on overwhelming firepower, large-scale mobilization, and the use of dated systems. In some ways, the war itself has already begun to reimpose the old logic of scale over precision.

Advocates of this approach within the Russian strategic community view it as a practical response to both internal limitations and external threats. As one expert interviewed by RAND noted, “Russia is quantity-oriented and commander-centric.” In this model, effectiveness is measured by numerical superiority and command obedience, not by flexibility, initiative, or innovation. A larger, conscript-based force is viewed as more feasible and culturally aligned with Russia’s defense identity.

Another analyst summarized the approach succinctly: “Russia will bet on quantity, not quality.” Even among those aware of the model’s operational weaknesses, there is a belief that with enough manpower and equipment, those weaknesses can be compensated for or overcome. This theory - that “mass becomes quality” through sheer volume - continues to hold sway among many senior figures in the military establishment.

Rebuilding with Mass, Not Precision

The old-model pathway envisions a reconstituted Russian military that surpasses its pre-2022 strength in terms of total personnel and hardware. It prioritizes expanding the size of the ground forces, particularly the Russian Army, which suffered the most in Ukraine. Strategic emphasis is placed on traditional branches - armor, artillery, and infantry - while high-tech investments are minimized or isolated.

This vision also hinges on a renewed focus on nuclear deterrence. Russia has long relied on its nuclear arsenal as a cornerstone of its defense policy. The state-owned nuclear energy conglomerate Rosatom, which oversees the entire nuclear production cycle from uranium mining to weapons development, is one of the few sectors in Russia capable of operating with high efficiency and technological sophistication. Under this pathway, nuclear capabilities are not merely preserved but expanded and modernized to compensate for conventional weaknesses.

Domestic Production and Strategic Self-Reliance

Instead of relying on foreign imports or technological partnerships, this model stresses self-sufficiency. Where qualitative gaps exist, they are addressed not through imported sophistication but through brute force or asymmetry. In other words, if Russia cannot match NATO’s precision or interoperability, it will seek to overwhelm with firepower, numbers, or unconventional means.

The plan draws strength from Russia’s relationship with Belarus, which provides not only political alignment but also industrial and human capital. Belarusian defense factories can supplement Russian production, while also serving as a logistical and personnel reservoir. In this sense, the Russia-Belarus alliance undergirds the viability of a mass-based military posture.

A Strategy of Urgency, Not Innovation

Perhaps the most compelling factor behind this model is its alignment with President Putin’s worldview. As noted by one NATO official interviewed by RAND, Putin is personally invested in the war’s outcome but reluctant to enact deep systemic change. The result is a preference for the familiar. “He’s willing to take more risks, but he’s not willing to make big changes,” the official explained. “Because Russia doesn’t have time, it’ll rely on what it has and what it knows, which is mass.”

This path avoids the uncertainties of modernization, leaning instead on proven if outdated formulas. It may be less elegant than other options, but for a leadership that prizes continuity and control over experimentation, it may prove the most politically palatable.

Pathway 3: A New, New Look – Toward a Leaner, Smarter Force

If Pathway 2 represents a regression to traditional methods, Pathway 3 seeks a forward leap. Termed “A New, New Look,” this approach envisions a postwar Russian military that is smaller in size but far more capable in qualitative terms. It revives the original ambitions of the 2008 “New Look” reforms, but with a sharper focus on modern warfare requirements that were previously underdeveloped or poorly resourced—especially personnel reform, asymmetric operations, and digital warfare capabilities.

Rather than rely on mass and conscription, this model prioritizes agility, professionalization, and the integration of elite units supported by advanced technology. It envisions a Russian military that can deter and fight more effectively, not by outnumbering opponents, but by outmaneuvering them. This vision reflects a strategic shift from quantity to quality, as Russia seeks to rebuild select portions of its military around performance rather than volume.

Feasibility and Internal Resistance

Despite the conceptual appeal, significant obstacles stand in the way of this transformation. One of the primary challenges lies in the deeply entrenched tradition of mass mobilization within the Russian defense culture. The country’s strategic mindset, bureaucratic structure, and political leadership are all more attuned to scaling up forces rather than selectively investing in smaller, high-tech units. As one RAND expert noted, this pathway will face institutional resistance and inertia.

Nevertheless, there is some room for change within specialized branches. Russian planners may seek to create “islands of professionalization”—small, elite forces trained to NATO-like standards, capable of rapid deployment and specialized missions. These would not replace the larger conscript base, but supplement it where precision is critical. Special operations forces, electronic warfare units, and cyberwarfare divisions are among the likeliest candidates for such reform.

Technology as a Double-Edged Sword

Central to this pathway is the question of technological capacity. The war in Ukraine has reinforced Russia’s awareness of its limitations relative to the West. Ukrainian forces, using older Western systems with superior targeting and communication capabilities, demonstrated the effectiveness of even modest tech advantages when applied strategically. This could encourage Russian leaders to emulate aspects of Western force design.

However, there are severe limitations to Russia’s ability to operationalize advanced technology. Years of sanctions, emigration of skilled professionals, and chronic underinvestment in research and development have weakened its high-tech industrial base. Microchips, optical components, and artificial intelligence systems—vital elements for the kind of military envisioned in this model—remain largely dependent on foreign supply chains that are increasingly restricted.

Moreover, the loss of technical specialists since 2022 has hollowed out segments of the defense sector. With many scientists, engineers, and information security experts leaving the country, the remaining workforce is aging and increasingly disconnected from global innovation cycles. These trends pose serious structural challenges to implementing the high-tech vision of “A New, New Look.”

The Role of Asymmetry and Specialization

To offset these challenges, Russia may lean more heavily on asymmetric capabilities. These include information warfare, cyber operations, covert action, and the expanded use of non-state actors such as private military companies. If integrated effectively, such forces could act as a force multiplier, allowing Russia to achieve its strategic aims without relying on conventional parity with NATO forces.

Ultimately, this pathway represents the most modern and strategically nimble option, but also the most difficult to realize. It would require not only material investment, but also a cultural shift within the military hierarchy—one that prizes flexibility, skill, and initiative over seniority and structure. Whether the Kremlin is prepared to embrace that shift remains an open question.

Pathway 4: A New Operational Model – Reinventing the Russian Military

The fourth and most radical pathway involves a complete departure from traditional Russian military doctrine. Referred to as “A New Operational Model,” this scenario envisions not just a revised structure or updated force, but a reimagined philosophy of war. In essence, it calls for a systemic overhaul of Russia’s defense institutions - an attempt to create a modern military aligned with 21st-century warfare, potentially drawing on Western or Chinese models as inspiration.

This option acknowledges a central truth exposed by the war in Ukraine: Russia’s inherited operational model has failed under the pressure of modern, networked, precision-based combat. The combination of inflexible hierarchies, slow decision-making, and inadequate adaptation to new technologies proved detrimental on the battlefield. “A New Operational Model” therefore begins with the premise that the status quo is no longer viable.

Adopting Foreign Concepts: Opportunity and Resistance

In this model, Russia would seek to emulate key aspects of modern military doctrine practiced by more adaptive and successful forces. This could include decentralized command (such as NATO’s mission command philosophy), integration of multi-domain operations, and joint-service interoperability. Chinese military theory might also offer a template, particularly in terms of rapid modernization and doctrinal evolution within a centrally controlled political framework.

But while borrowing foreign models sounds practical in theory, it faces steep resistance in practice. Russian political and military culture strongly disincentivizes initiative at lower levels of command. Decision-making remains top-down, with authority concentrated at the highest echelons. Excellence, particularly when it disrupts hierarchy or tradition, is often punished rather than rewarded - a system described by some experts as one of “negative selection.”

In such an environment, promoting agility, tactical flexibility, and independent decision-making would require not just structural reform, but a cultural revolution. That is a tall order for a state apparatus that remains deeply authoritarian and resistant to internal dissent.

Can It Be Done?

There is, however, a narrow path through which this model might emerge. If battlefield commanders from Ukraine - many of whom were forced by necessity to act independently and creatively under fire - ascend into higher strategic positions, they could become agents of change within the defense establishment. Their lived experience might offer a more pragmatic, less dogmatic view of warfare. Over time, this could shift internal dynamics in favor of reform.

Nonetheless, even under optimal conditions, this pathway remains the least likely in the short term. It would require long-term commitment, institutional humility, and a willingness to challenge deeply rooted norms. Russia’s military tradition, forged over decades of centralized control and strategic rigidity, is not easily dismantled.

Foreign Assistance and Limits of Partnership

To pursue this model, Russia would need to seek external expertise and support - whether through military exchanges, joint exercises, or technology acquisition. China, Iran, and North Korea could all play roles, though their capabilities and strategic alignment vary widely. China in particular offers potential insights, given its success in building a modern, information-centric military. However, RAND’s analysis suggests that the Sino-Russian relationship is far more constrained than public rhetoric suggests.

Despite talk of a “no limits” partnership, Beijing remains wary of deep entanglement. Differing risk tolerances, competitive instincts, and concerns over global image limit China’s willingness to fully back Russian military restructuring. Moreover, Russia itself may resist relying too heavily on foreign models, preferring to develop a uniquely Russian solution - even at the cost of slower progress.

In summary, “A New Operational Model” is bold, transformative, and potentially effective - but also the least compatible with Russia’s current institutional DNA. Its realization would signify not only military reform, but a profound political and cultural shift inside the Kremlin’s power architecture.

Strategic Implications and Final Reflections

The RAND analysis offers several vital takeaways for military planners, policymakers, and observers seeking to understand the shape of Russia’s future military. One of the most important is this: the way the war in Ukraine ends will profoundly influence the lessons Russia internalizes. These lessons, in turn, will shape the choices it makes not just in reconstituting its armed forces, but in defining its place in the international order.

Notably, the conclusions that Russian leadership draws may differ sharply from those assumed by Western analysts. While the West might interpret the war as a failure of outdated doctrine, Russia could see it as a justification for tightening state control, enhancing mass mobilization, and reinforcing hardline military traditions. Moscow’s historic willingness to accept high casualties - and its resistance to internal criticism - may reduce pressure for systemic reform, even in the face of clear operational failures.

Geopolitical Alliances and Postwar Dependencies

Russia’s foreign relationships, particularly with China, will play a decisive role in shaping its postwar military. The war has deepened Russia’s economic and strategic dependence on Beijing, positioning China as both lifeline and constraint. China cannot afford a Russian collapse, but it is equally unlikely to compromise its global interests solely to sustain Moscow’s ambitions. The partnership, while essential, has clear limits.

Other allies - Iran, North Korea, and Belarus - offer more tactical than strategic support. Their contributions, though not negligible, are unlikely to influence the deeper structural transformation Russia requires. Belarus can supplement manpower and production. Iran can provide drones and possibly training. But none of these actors can offer a model for large-scale modernization or doctrinal reinvention.

The Military-Industrial Trap

A further complication is Russia’s growing reliance on a wartime economy. The pivot to total defense production has created a set of “path dependencies” that will be difficult to reverse. The defense industrial base now depends heavily on state subsidies and emergency procurement measures. Even after hostilities end, dismantling this framework would be politically risky and economically destabilizing. As such, there is a real possibility that Russia could maintain a semi-militarized economy long after the war concludes - entrenching defense spending as a permanent feature of national policy.

Quality vs. Speed: A Western Dilemma

For NATO and U.S. planners, one of the key challenges will be balancing concerns about the pace of Russian reconstitution with attention to its nature. While rapid reconstitution might suggest urgency, even a slow, qualitative rebuild could pose significant threats, particularly if it emphasizes unpredictability, irregular warfare, and nuclear deterrence.

RAND researchers caution that Russia need not fully rebuild to be dangerous. A partially reconstituted force - grounded in mass mobilization, asymmetric tactics, and nuclear signaling - may be harder to anticipate and deter than a fully modernized military. In that sense, what may look like a step backward in capability could, paradoxically, make Russia a more volatile and disruptive actor in the European security environment.

Sources

  1. Russia’s Military After Ukraine: Potential Pathways for the Postwar Reconstitution of the Russian Armed Forces - RAND Corporation
  2. Russian Ministry of Defense Statements and Doctrinal Publications, 2008 - 2024
  3. NATO Briefings and RAND Interviews with Analysts in Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Sweden
  4. Official Records on the “New Look” Reforms and Shoigu-Era Military Initiatives
  5. Analytical Reports on Sino-Russian Defense Relations and Foreign Military Aid During the Ukraine War